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Abstract
Hcrders in  Mongolial have  suffercd tremenidous  losses  in  countries  that perform  an animal  census  every year.  'rhis
recent dzu,d (winter disasters),  with  livestock  mortality  con cept may  therefore he precisely  what is needed  to
rates of over 50 percent  in some  locales. This studv  start a social  livestock  insurance  program.
exainiiies  the  feasibility  of offering  insuranice  to  Just as importanlt,  the  instirance  that  is used  in
coompenisate  for animial  deatihs.  Suchi  an  undertaking  is  Mongolia  shotild  not interfere  with  the exceptional
challeniginig  in any  country.  Mongolia  offers  CvCeI  more  efforts that experienced  herders  take to save  animiials
challenges  given  the vast territory  in  which  herders  tend  durinig severe  weathier.  Using  an individual  insurance
over 30 million animials.  lTraditional  approaches  that  max,  in  fact,  diminish these efforts.  Herders  may ask,
insure  individual  annials are simply not workable.  The  "Why should  I work so  hard to save  my animals  if I will
opportLuitics  for fraud  and  abuse are  significanlt.  simplpy  he compensated  for those  that  are lost?"  Since the
Monitoring  costs required  to mitigate  this hehavior  index  insurance  would  pay  all  herders in  the same  region
wVouIld  be vcry  high.  the same  rate,  the incentives  for  management to mitigate
This study  focuscs  on the porential  for  uising  the  livestock  losses remain  strong.  No one  would reduce
livestock  mortality  rate at a  local level  (for  example,  the  their effort  to collect on insuraice. Those  who  incrcase
sum or rural  district)  as  the basis  for  indemnifying  their cfforts during  a  major event  (dZud) xvould  likely  be
herders.  Applications  of index insurance  are growing  compensated  for this effort even  thotigh they  do not lose
around  the wvorld,  although  no COlintrNrhas  so far  livestock.  In some  cases,  they  could reasonably  expcr  tO
implemilenited  sucIh  insuranice  for livestock  deatihs.  Buit  few  rcceive payments  that wVolI]d  compensate  for the  added
cOuIntries  have such  frcqtLienr  and  high  rates  of localized  effort  or the  added cost of trying to save  their livestock.
animn-al  deaths as does Mongolia,  and it  is once  of the  few
'lUhis paper-a produict of the Rural  Development and NatLral Resources Scctor Unit, East Asia and Pacific  Region-is part
of a  larger effort  in  the region to fostcr  seCLirc and  sustainable  livelihoods throuigh  analytical  and operational  support for
risk management  and  asset  diversification  strategies. The  work described  in  this paper  is finding  operational  application
ulider thc  Mongolia Sustainable  Livelihoods  Project.  Copies of the paper are available free  from the World  Bank,  1818  H
Striect NW, Washinigtoni,  DC 20433.  Please contact Evelyn  Lagucidao,  roomil  MC9-324,  telephone 202-458-2450,  fax 202-
477-27.33,  eimail  address  elaguidaoC@,wvorldbanik.org.  Policy  Research  Working  Papers  are  also  posted  on  the  Web  at
http://econ.worldbank.org.  Jerry  Skees  may be contacted  at jskees@3qx.net.  September  2002.  (36 pages)
The  Policy  lResecarcf.'  Working  Paper Series disseminates the fiiidinigs of wvork  in  progress  to entcoutrage the  exchange of ideas about
development  issutes. An objective of/te series is to get the findinigs onut quickly. eve,,  if the presenltationis  are less thanl fuil) polished. The
papers carrr  the  narmes of the authors anld should be cited accordim,g'v.  The finzdzings,  interpretations,  and conclusions expressed in this
paper are entirely those ofJ  theauthbors.  Tbev dli  not niecessaril/ represent  the  Iieu'  oLf  the  World Bank,  its Executive Directors, or the
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Herders  in  Mongolia  have  suffered  tremendous  losses  in  recent  dzud  with
mortality  values  of over  half of the animals  in  a number of sum.  This  study examines
three  alternatives  to  insure  livestock  deaths  in  Mongolia:  1)  traditional  livestock
insurance that pays individual herders based on their specific losses; 2) weather insurance
that  would pay when weather events  that are likely to create serious losses occur;  and 3)
index  insurance  that  would pay when  livestock  mortality rates exceed  certain  thresholds
by sum.
No  approach  will  be  easy  and  none  offers  the  perfect  answer.  However,  after
careful  analysis,  mortality  index  insurance  appears  to  offer  the  best  choice.  This
recommendation  is made with several key performance  criteria in mind:  1) the insurance
should not reward poor managers;  2) the insurance must be affordable by a large number
of herders and others  at risk when major livestock losses occur;  3) the insurance  must be
sustainable and profitable for emerging private insurance  companies; 4) the first products
should  focus  on  the  most  significant  covariant  risk;  5)  a  proper  role  for  government
should be  to  foster development  of risk  sharing  markets  without  imposing  large  social
cost;  and  6)  the  insurance  should  work  in harmony  with  other initiatives,  including  the
vast array of emergency  assistance that is provided.
The mortality index insurance concept meets most of the performance criteria.  In
particular,  since this insurance would pay all herders  in the  same sum or bag at the same
rate,  the  incentives  for management  to mitigate  livestock  losses remain  strong.  Noone
would reduce their effort to collect on insurance.  Those who increase their efforts during
a major event (dzud) would likely be compensated  for this effort even though they do not
lose  livestock.  In  some  cases,  they  could  reasonably  expect  to  receive  payments  that
would compensate for the added effort or the added cost of trying to save their livestock.
The  mortality  index  insurance  would  pay  anytime  the  mortality  rate  (adult
livestock  deaths  divided  by  the  total  census  number  of  livestock  in  the  area  at  the
beginning  of  the  year)  exceeds  a  well  specified  threshold.  The  payment  would  be  a
function  of the mortality  rate times  the amount  of protection  (or liability) purchased  by
the  herder.  This  insurance  is  1)  simple;  2)  largely  free  of the  common  problems  of
adverse  selection  and moral  hazard;  3) easy  to administer  with  low  administrative  cost;
and 4) largely effective for getting ready cash to herders  in a region during a major event.
Data  for  a  limited  number  of sum  in  nearly  every  aimag  were  available  from
1969-2000.  These  data  afforded  the  opportunity  to  perform  an  assessment  of the  risk
associated  with  offering  a mortality  index  insurance  program  across  Mongolia.  While
anyone  who  knows  the  recent  history  of losses  understands  that  a  very  high  level  of
covariate risk is present,  these data show that serious  losses occur in livestock  in about  1
in 5 years.  This  is the frequency  of loss ratios  (indemnity divided  by pure premium)  in
excess of 200% in the simulated mortality index insurance program that would  be spreadacross Mongolia.  And while 2000 is the worst year in the 30 years of data,  1969 is nearly
as bad.  Historical  records also suggest that  1944 was more serious with mortality rates in
excess of 30%.  These losses would make a mortality index insurance program costly and
require  some risk sharing  in the intemational  capital markets.  The report provides  ideas
about  how  this might occur  with  both  traditional  reinsurance  and the emerging  weather
markets.
The analysis  also demonstrates  that  there are  great differences  in the relative risk
of  livestock  losses  across  Mongolia.  On  a  standardized  basis,  the risk  index  that  was
created  for  all  species  suggest  that  6  of  27  aimags  have  risk  that  are  3 times  or more
higher than  the risk in the lowest set of aimags.  This magnitude of differences  speaks  to
the need to set different  premium rates across Mongolia for any insurance program.  Such
information  also raises  serious concerns  about the current proposals regarding  mandatory
insurance  that would charge  everyone  the same  premium rates.  This idea  is flawed  and
would create  the wrong  incentives  with  transfers from those herders  in low risk  areas to
those  in high-risk  areas.  Such  transfers  not  only raise  equity concerns,  but  also  would
create  significant  inefficiencies.  The  report  also  discusses  why  mandatory  individual
insurance  would  run  counter  to the  goal  of improving  risk mitigation  strategies  among
herders.
At this stage, there  are a number of additional  items that would need  attention  as
first steps in designing  a pilot project to test the feasibility and acceptability  of mortality
index insurance.  Some basic considerations  and next steps follow:
1.  Collect  data on mortality and adult livestock  numbers for more  sum;  make
certain  that  these  data  are  complete  for  all  species  of livestock  for  at  least  30
years;  create  a data  set for as many  sum  as possible  but,  at  a minimum,  obtain  a
geographic  spread of sum within a aimag and complete  at least five sum for each
aimag.
2.  Investigate  in some  detail the statistical system  that is being used  to  develop
the  census  of  animals  and  the  reporting  of  mortality  of  animals.  This
investigation should be conducted  with a clear picture of how these data might be
used to make  insurance payments.  A number of issues should be investigated:  1)
what is the quality of these data? 2)  Could the data be developed at the bag level?
3)  Has the  process  for developing  the data  changed  in any  significant  fashion  in
the  last  30  years?  4)  Have  the  data  been  used  in  the  past to  make  emergency
disaster  payments  and,  if  so,  is  there  any  evidence  that  this  created  any
misrepresentation  in the data? 5)  Given that a census is taken every year, are there
adequate  safeguards  and accounting  systems  in place  to mitigate  the opportunity
for manipulating  the data? 6) What auditing systems might be added to assure that
the  data process  does  not change  when  a insurance  payments  are  being made  on
the basis of the data? 7)  How do herders  and others view the quality of the data?
3.  Select  a  sample  of  sum  to  offer  the mortality  index  insurance.  Initially,  the
government could collaborate  with the private insurers  and make insurance offers
in  a select sample of sum.  The sample should  be selected with some geographical
spread  in  mind.  Ideally,  the offers  would be made  in  about 30 sum.  Given  thatthe  mortality  data  are  widely  available,  it  may  be  possible  to  make  select  a
representative  sum  in every  aimag to begin  the  pilot.  This  would give  as  much
geographic  spread  as possible  and provide  the  needed  publicity  across  Mongolia
for the concept.  Great  care should be taken in making certain that the price  that is
charged  reflects  the  relative  risk.  The  premium  rates  charged  herders  and  the
design of the contracts  should be consistent with  market principles.  Initially,  the
govemnment  could  provide  some  level  of reinsurance  to private  provides  to  get
their  involvement.  Simultaneously,  the  concept  and  pilot  design  should  be
presented  to the intemational capital markets  obtaining their input and attempting
to get their involvement in offering reinsurance.
4.  Develop  an extended  education and marketing program.  Any  successful  pilot
must educate  herders  about  the potential  value  and  use  of this insurance.  Some
considerable  attention  should be paid to an educational effort.
5.  Establish appropriate feedback  and monitoring of the pilot.  A pilot program
should  be designed  to  allow  for learning  about  the concept.  This learning  must
involve a number of dimensions:  a) how  have  the private insurers  respond to  the
opportunity?  b) how have  the  herders responded?  c) are  herders  thinking of and
using  infonnal  and  formal  mechanisms  to  share  the  index  payments  within  the
community?  d)  has  the  introduction  of  the  index  insurance  changed  the  data
development process  in any significant fashion?
Much  of the effort for a pilot test of mortality insurance could be supported  in the
pastoral  risk  management  project.  However,  it  would  also  be  an  opportunity  to  gain
support from some traditional NGOs.  They should  be keen to see progress made  in this
direction.  If the pilot were offered  in  areas that comprised  about  5%  of the  livestock  in
Mongolia, the total possible market would be 5%  of Tg  1 Trillion or about Tg 50 billion.
Initial  sales  would  likely  not exceed  10%  bringing  the  number  to  Tg 5 billion.  With
premiums set at a  3%  rate, it would require only  about $US  60,000 to set premiums  at a
break  even  rate  for  herders.  This  level  of  support  may  be  wise  in  a  pilot  program.
Additional financing would be needed for resources  to examine the issues outlined above
and for education and marketing.Livestock  Insurance in Mongolia  Page  1
Examining the Feasibility of Livestock  Insurance in Mongolia
Livestock  herds  are  a  vital  component  of the  Mongolian  economy  making  up
about one third of the GDP.  Further, livestock herders and their families make up a large
percentage  of the  poor  in  Mongolia.  Eighty  percent  of the  herders  have  less  than 200
animals.  Herd sizes  need to be greater than 200 to sustain a family  at a reasonable  level
of income.  Added to the low levels of income for a vast number of the Mongolian herder
families,  are the  persistent  risks that  plague livestock.  Devastating  livestock losses  are
common  in Mongolia.  Natural disasters  and disease not only create  serious hardships  in
the  short  term but  these  type of risk  also likely retard the development  process.  Given
that there are few  coping  mechanisms  other than the informal family  arrangements,  the
high  level  of  risk  adds  to  the  risk  adverse  behavior  of  poor  herder  families.  The
development  literature  clearly  shows  that these type  of risks  both slow  the  adoption  of
new  technology and hamper  the financial  markets.  Bankers  in Mongolia list  risk as the
number one reason they don't loan money to herders.
Thus, it is clear livestock insurance could be an important innovation in Mongolia
for any number of reasons.  However,  there  are few success  stories in the world of wide
spread  livestock  insurance.  Many  good  reasons  underlie  the  problems  with  livestock
insurance.  The opportunities for abuse are significant.  Livestock management  is key to
mitigating  losses.  This creates  opportunities  for adverse  selection  by those who consider
the  insurance  a  'good  deal'  given  their  management  practices.  Those  who  are better
managers  will  opt out.  Further, once  the insurance  is available,  moral hazard  may occur
as managers change  their practices  and become more risky.  Controlling adverse selection
and  moral  hazard  requires  investments  in  data  and  monitoring.  In  a  country  like
Mongolia,  it  is  nearly  impossible  to  envision  effective  monitoring  systems.  Vast
distances  separate  the  nomadic  herders  across  the  country.  Vast  differences  in
management  styles  and  risk among  herders  are common.  It is also nearly impossible  to
imagine  risk  classification  systems  that  would  identify  these  differences  before  the
insurance  is  sold.  Finally,  the  large  covariate  risks  that  are  present  in  Mongolian
livestock  herding  operations  make  livestock  insurance  extremely  challenging  for  an
emerging  private  insurance  market  that  is  unaccustomed  to  using international  capital
markets to share risk.
Despite these fundamental  problems,  the need for livestock insurance in Mongolia
is  very real.  This paper  takes on the challenges  of making  livestock insurance  work  in
Mongolia.  It is organized  into three primary sections:  1) a brief discussion of impressions
and  the  setting that  raise  concerns  about  the  existing  insurance  system  and  even  the
opportunities  to introduce weather based insurance2; 2) introducing the recommendations
and  the  reasons  for  the  recommendations;  and  3)  a  detailed  analysis  of  the
recommendations.  While any number of alternatives may be tried, the limitation of many
of  the  choices  leads  to  a  relatively  focused  recommendation.  The  logic  for  this
recommendation  should emerge  as the  sections  are  developed.  The recommendation  is
made  with  several  key  performance  criteria in mind:  1) the insurance  should not reward
2This section benefits  from readings and reports prepared by others and interviews  conducted by the
authors from July 30-August 7,  2001.Livestock  Insurance in Mongolia  Page 2
poor  managers;  2)  the  insurance  must  be  affordable  by a  large  number  of herders  and
others at risk when major livestock losses  occur;  3) the insurance  must be sustainable  and
profitable for emerging private insurance  companies;  4) the first products should focus on
the most significant  covariant  risk;  5)  a proper role  for government  should  be carefully
identified;  and 6) the insurance  should  work in harmony  with other initiatives,  including
the vast array of emergency  assistance that is provided.
Three  classes  of  alternatives  should  be  considered:  1) revamping  the  existing
insurance  that  provide  individual  coverage  to  herders;  2)  the  introduction  of  weather
insurance  to protect  against the most serious weather  events  that cause  serious  economic
losses;  and  3)  the  introduction  of index  insurance  that  would pay based  on  sum  or bag
mortality losses.  Each has advantages  and disadvantages.  Yet, as will  become  clear,  the
first  two  options  present  significant  challenges  and  run  counter  to  some  important
performance  criteria.  The third alternative  also has  limitations; nonetheless,  it appears  to
hold  some  promise  as  it  meets  many  of  the  performance  criteria.  In  addition,  with
modest funding this idea could be introduced relatively  quickly on a pilot basis.
Impressions and Background
Consecutive  dzud,  harsh  winter conditions,  in Mongolia  have  been  devastating.
High  rates  of livestock  death  marked  both  the  winter  of  1999-2000  and  2000-2001.
Across  Mongolia  these  rates  averaged  about  10%  in  1999-2000  and  about  7.3%  as  of
April 25, 2001 for 2000-2001.  Obviously, when  the data are disaggregated  to the aimags
(provinces),  sum  (counties),  or bag (communities  within  the sum)  level  some  areas  had
significantly higher losses (in excess of 50 percent in certain sum).
Numerous theories  have emerged  as to why  the losses were so  high.  No doubt a
combination  of explanations  gives insights  into the  problem.  Two general  categories  of
explanations  dominate:  1) the  weather;  and  2) the  macro  environment.  Weather events
include:  1) drought prior to winter;  2) heavy snow;  3) cold temperatures; 4) freezing  and
thawing  of  snow  causing  ice;  and  5)  the  combination  of  these  events.  Macro
environment  explanations  include:  1) the  inexperienced  herders  that  have  returned  to
herding  after reform;  2) the  breakdown  in the infrastructure  of wells for water along the
traditional  routes of otor;  3)  the lack of forage reserves  that were supplied  by the former
regime;  and 4) a general  lack of capital to purchase needed feed during the dzud.
While it is common  to express  concern that the macro  environmental  events  have
created  a structural  shift and added to the risk in Mongolia,  caution  should be taken.  As
devastating  as  recent  years  have  been,  at  least  four or  five  years  during  the  period  of
1944-1993  had equal  or greater mortality rates for livestock:  1944,  1967,  1969, 1983,  and
1993.  The  1944 dzud was  the most severe by some measure with  around one third of the
livestock  in  Mongolia  lost.  Interviews  with  herders  suggest  that  they  work  hard  to
mitigate  risk.  The incentives  to  do so  are stronger  today than  in  the past  given  private
ownership  of  livestock.  In  short,  it is  simply  too early  to  draw  any  strong  conclusions
regarding  whether  there  has  been  a  structural  shift that makes  Mongolia  more  risky  onLivestock Insurance in Mongolia  Page  3
average for livestock producers.  Nonetheless,  the prudent policy makers  at various levels
are now focused on a host of solutions.
The  World  Bank  Sustainable  Livelihoods  project  is  one  such  effort  to  find
solutions.  Three core activities  are being coordinated:  1) management of pastoral risk; 2)
development of community  investment  funds; and 3)  improving  the role of rural  micro-
finance  services.  This  report  is  part  of  the  pastoral  risk  management  component,
however,  important linkages  will be made to the other two components.  A major thrust
of  the pastoral  risk management  component  is  to provide integrated  strategies  to  assist
herders  in  managing  the  covariant  risk  in Mongolian  pastoral  livestock production.  A
host of strategies  are being considered.  Insurance is one.  An extremely  important aspect
of providing  integrated  strategies  is that  they not work at  cross-purposes.  This  guiding
principle plays a major role in the focus of this paper.
Significant  efforts  are underway  to  provide herders  the information  and training
necessary  so  that  they  can  effectively  mitigate  risk.  Investments  in forage  equipment,
improved  weather  forecasting,  skill  development,  etc.  are all  targeted at helping  herders
mitigate the effects of devastating weather and dzud.  Key to these efforts is that herders
become  better  managers  and that they have incentives  to work  hard to reduce  livestock
losses.  Losing large numbers of livestock creates a long-term problem as it takes time to
recover  from  such  losses.  Thus,  it  is  also  in  the  interest  of  the  broader  society  that
herders  be  given  the  proper  incentives  to  reduce  livestock  losses.  Poorly  designed
insurance  products  could  negate  the  incentives  that  are  being  structured  so  carefully.
Under certain conditions, some herders may choose to reduce their intensive management
when they have  insurance.  Any insurance  product  that fits into the  overall objective  of
improving the risk mitigation  of herders  must be  designed with  these concerns  in mind.
Successful insurance cannot pay for bad management.  If the insurance compensates  poor
managers  who  are  not  working  hard to mitigate  risk during  major  weather events,  two
serious  problems  will  emerge:  1) the  insurance  will fail  and 2)  the  insurance  will work
against the other efforts underway to improve management.
Financial  Markets in Mongolia
The financial  sector  is emerging slowly.  There are excellent professionals  in both
the  banking  and  insurance  sectors.  While  there  may  be  strong  interest  in  developing
livestock insurance,  the  task will not be easy.  Further,  the private  insurance  companies
understand  fully  how  difficult  such  a  task  will  be,  given  the  high  transaction  costs  of
monitoring  for  both  properly  classifying  risk  and  for sound  underwriting.  They  also
understand  that  the covariate  nature  of this risk in Mongolia  makes it nearly impossible
given  their  limited  capital  reserves.  The  private  companies  will  simply  not  offer
livestock  insurance  on  any  significant  scale.  There  may  be  as  many  as  10  private
insurance  companies in Mongolia.  One of those companies is offering  some 20 insurance
products  and  makes  extensive  use  of  the international  reinsurance  markets.  Still,  that
company has no interest in offering livestock insurance to individual herders.Livestock  Insurance in Mongolia  Page 4
The existing  livestock  insurance  is offered by Mongol Daatgal Company  and one
other  state owned  company.  This parastatal  insurance  is  a carryover  from the  previous
regime.  The participation is quite low, even  in the case of an area where it was required
as  a condition  after  getting  special  loans  for restocking.  Few herders  really understand
the  current  program  and  the overall  uptake  appears  to  be  as  low  as  a  few  percentage
points.  For  those  herders  who  have  considered  this  insurance,  premium  charges  are
considered  too  high.  A  6 percent  premium  rate  is  charged  to all  herders,  regardless  of
where  they  operate.  The  relative  risk  of livestock  losses  varies  greatly  by region.  The
payments  for  this  general  herd  insurance  are  100%  of insured  value  less  any  proceed
from  sale of skin and bones when the animal dies from weather related causes.  Evidence
of poor weather must be provided by the sum Meteorological  office.
Even  if  the  existing  insurance  company  had  a  large  uptake,  it  is  highly
questionable  that  the  program  would  be  successful.  There  is  no  reinsurance  for the
program  and  management  of  the  program  freely  admitted  serious  concerns  about  the
viability of the  program even  to the point of indicating that there  was  little desire to get
more  participation  for  fear  of  major  loss.  These  fears  are  well  founded  given  the
covariate  risks  that  are  present  in  livestock  losses.  This  principle  will  be  further
described  and  analyzed  below.  However,  the  estimate  of  the  losses  for  2000
demonstrates  the point.  The premium  value  was roughly  Tg 40 million.  Indemnities
were  about  4  times  the  premium  value  at  roughly  Tg  160  million.  Given  that  the
livestock herd in Mongolia  is worth in excess of Tg 1 trillion, a Tg 40 million premium is
an extremely small fraction of the value (far less than even one tenth of 1%).
Given  recent  livestock  losses,  it  is  not  surprising  to  learn  that  interest  among
herders  about  livestock  insurance  is  growing.  The  Gobi  Initiative  did  interview  146
master  herders  from  Umngovi,  Dundgovi,  Uvurkhangal  and  Govi-Altai  aimags  about
their  interest  in  livestock  insurance.  Only  5%  of  these  herders  had  any  previous
experience  with  buying  livestock  insurance.  When  ask  about  their  interest  in  such
insurance:  49%  said they  were  interested;  32%  would probably  buy;  and  17%  said they
were not  interested.  However,  the  willingness to pay was relatively  low  with premium
rates at around  3%  of value insured.  For the question about what should be a reasonable
cost  of  insurance  for  those  who  said  they  were  interested  the  responses  were:  11%
checked  less  than  1%;  51%  checked  1%  to  3%;  25%  checked  4%  to  7%;  and  12%
checked  10%.
While these results  are interesting,  it is important not to make too much of them.
First,  this  is  not  a  random  sample.  These  are  the  master  herders  who  were  seeking
information  by attending  a conference.  If there is a bias it is likely that the  interest  and
willingness to pay are biased upward above the general  population of herders.  Second,  it
is not  surprising  to  see  large  uptakes  in  agricultural  insurance  immediately  following a
disaster.  Several  references  are  made  in  a  number  of  reports  about  herders  being
complacent  about  natural  disaster  after  experiencing  several  years  with  no  problems.
This is also quite  common  with  agricultural  insurance.  This also  speaks  to the  need to
design  an  insurance  alternative  that  will  make  relatively  frequent  payments if possible.
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purchase the insurance.  Third, it is really difficult to gauge the true willingness  to pay for
insurance  until  someone  is  provided  the  specific  details  about  how  the  insurance  will
work. That being said,  a target premium rate in the 3% to 5%  range is a reasonable  target
for herders  who  are  short on  cash.  The  current  insurance  is  not  aggressively  marketed
even  though  there  are  27  branches  of the Mongol  Daatgal  Company,  with  at  least  one
branch  in every  aimag.  We  were  told  that these  agents  currently  concentrate  on  other
lines  of insurance.  Their presence  in each  aimag  is important  nonetheless  for any  new
initiatives in livestock insurance.
The parliament  recently  rejected  an expanded  livestock  insurance  program  that
would  make  it  mandatory  for  livestock  herders  to  insure  their  breeding  stock.  Two
reasons were  given for this  decision by parliament:  1) livestock are now  privately owned
and  the  government  can't  force  owners  to  insure;  and  2)  the  government  can't  force
private companies to offer insurance that is too risky and will bankrupt  them.  One herder
summed  the  concerns  up  best  when  he  said,  "maybe  it  is  better  for  me  to  spend  my
money  on  forage  than  insurance".  Forage  is  a  form  of  insurance  and  this  herder's
instincts are likely correct.
The livestock insurance legislation is currently being redrafted within  the Ministry
of Food and Agriculture (see Appendix  A for an unofficial  translation of the current draft
legislation).  As  will  be  more  fully  developed  below,  mandatory  insurance  is  highly
questionable  given  the  likely  problems  with  actually  classifying  herder  risk.  Some
herders  have a higher likelihood of loss than others, even higher than their neighbors who
are herding in  the same region.  These higher  risk  herders  are difficult  to  identify.  The
current  system makes no attempt to differentiate  these risks  and price accordingly.  Thus,
if  all  herders  did  purchase  the  current  insurance  policy,  the  herders  who  are  better
managers  would be paying  for the losses  of those who  are poorer managers.  The current
draft of legislation  would charge  a flat 2%  rate3. Given the data on mortality,  this rate is
highly  questionable.  The rate  appears  to  be  woefully  inadequate  for the  risks  that  are
being  insured.  No private  insurance company  is likely  to want  to engage  in  selling this
insurance.  Furthermore,  it is highly  unlikely  than  any reinsurer  would  be interested  in
coming to Mongolia with these rates and this system.
While the argument is that with full participation  there would be some  economies
of scale and an improved pooling of risk,  neither of these benefits is likely to be realized
with mandatory  livestock  insurance.  The incremental  costs of delivering  and monitoring
an  individual  insurance  program  are  likely  to  be  similar  regardless  of  the  number  of
herders  insured.  Further,  while there  are  some  gains to be made  in pooling the  risks of
livestock  losses  across  Mongolia,  there  is  still  a  very  large  covariant  risk  that  would
create serious reinsurance problems for the current system.
3 There was some indication  that the 2%  value had been increased to 4%.  However, this is not confirmed.
Even 4% is unlikely adequate to support a totally private market policy with the coverage outlined in
Appendix A.  Someone inside the Ministry has done some analysis on this issue.  However, we were not
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The banking  community is very hesitant to loan money to herders.  The Ag Bank
of Mongolia  is involved in the new micro-finance  initiative to make a few select loans to
herders.  Managers of private banks in Mongolia appear to make very few loans to herders
and  cite  the  risk  as  the  major  reason.  Bankers  who  were  presented  with  the  idea  of
insuring  based  on  mortality  losses  within  the  sum  expressed  a  keen  interest  in  this
alternative  insurance.  They  understood  the  potential  value  and  indicated  that  if such
insurance  were  available  they  would  consider  loaning  to  herders.  Given  the  strong
reactions  from  managers  of  private  banks,  the  possibility  of linking  such  insurance  to
loans with the micro-finance  initiatives underway  is worth further consideration.
Potential Opportunities  for Weather Based Insurance
There  is  a  growing interest  in weather  based  insurance  around  the  world.  These
new markets  and  insurance  products  may  offer some  potential  in Mongolia.  The World
Bank  has  been  involved  with  investigating  the  opportunity  for  such  insurance  in
Morocco,  Mexico,  Tunisia,  Ethiopia,  and Nicaragua.  Morocco  is very close  to offering
sunflower  and  cereal  grain  farmers  insurance  that  would  pay  when  rainfall  is  below
certain  thresholds  during  critical  growing  periods.  Mexico  is considering  using  similar
rainfall policies to finance natural disaster relief efforts by provinces.
The Mongolia  Meteorology  Agency  is  a  professionally  managed  agency  with  a
long history of collecting detailed  weather data.  The current director is also the president
of the World Meteorology  Organization  of Asia.  Mongolia  follows the WMO standards
and  has done  so  for several  decades.  Quality data should be available for most weather
statistics.  Further,  the  Meteorology  Agency  has  conducted  numerous  studies  and
developed  detailed  maps  of  a  great  number  of  weather  data.  The  data  have  been
processed into useful information  and it is clear that the agency plays  a major role in both
early warning systems as well as helping explain causes after major events  in Mongolia.
Drought  is a  significant  problem  in Mongolia.  Thus,  there  is some  potential  to
investigate offering insurance  against rainfall shortfalls during the critical  months of June
and July.  As John  Morton  points out in  his report,  such insurance  could  provide timely
payments  that  would be  used to  purchase  fodder  and other  feeds prior  to going into  the
winter.  Further,  the  combination  of drought  during  the  summer  months  followed  by
extreme  cold  during  the  following  winter  may  be  an  option  worth  consideration.
However,  it is also true that a multitude of weather events create  a dzud. The description
from  "Lessons  Learnt  from  the  Dzud  1999-2000"  by  the  UJNDP  provides  an excellent
summary of the multitude of causes:
"The  main  cause  of  Dzud  disaster  in  affected  areas  had  resulted  from  a
combination  of  the  following  factors.  Firstly  the  livestock  had  become
exhausted  due to  both black  dzud (lack of precipitation  which leaves  livestock
without  any  water  supply)  and  white  dzud  (the  snowfall  is  too  deep  for the
livestock to reach the grass below), in the wither of 1998-1999, a severe summer
drought in  1999 led to further weakness of livestock.  This situation was further
aggravated  by poor pasture and lack of hay.  Heavy snowfall  in November andLivestock  Insurance in Mongolia  Page 7
December  was followed  by its melting  and  icing,  leading to  the so-called  iron
dzud  (an  impenetrable  ice-cover  forms  over  the  pasture  that  makes  grazing
impossible).  In  late December the snow  cover became much  thicker making  it
impossible  for  the  livestock  to  graze  on  pasture  (white  dzud).  Due  to  the
extreme  coldness  in January  and  February  and  insufficient  bodyweight  many
thousands of livestock died from starvation and freezing."
Hoof dzud is also mentioned as a problem.  A hoof dzuf occurs  when  there are
too many hoofs in one area as herders from a problem  area have moved  their animals
in an attempt  to find forage.  The result  is over grazing.  Obviously  this problem  is
not created  by local  weather events.  In short, there are an overwhelming  number of
weather  conditions  and  other  factors  that  create  dzud  in  Mongolia.  In  his  1997
master's  thesis,  Enkh-Amgalan  created  statistical  models  to explain  growth  rate  of
livestock  between  1969  and  1990 for 36 sum spread across Mongolia.  He attempted
to  explain  variation  in  the growth  rate  (basically  the  birth  rate  minus  the mortality
rate)  using  weather  variables.  This work is discouraging regarding  the potential  of
any  weather-based  insurance  for protecting  against livestock  losses.  Enkh-Amgalan
had  to  create  a  myriad  of weather  variables  and  then  use  stepwise  regression  to
obtain explanatory  power with his models.  Each sum had unique weather events that
helped explain the growth rates.
The combination  of the general descriptions  of a variety of sources  about the
cause  of  a  dzud  and  the  detailed  work  of Enkh-Amgalan  create  serious  concerns
about the use of weather based insurance for managing herder losses.  Further, while
the Meteorology  data appear to be of high  quality, the basic  stations may  be too far
apart in many regions to satisfy the requirement  of weather insurance  at a local level.
Weather insurance should be considered as a means  of reinsuring the alternative  that
is recommended  in this paper.  It is likely that  an  index  of weather  events  could be
created  to  explain  the  most serious  insurance  losses  across  Mongolia.  Given  that
weather can now be traded in a global market,  this option may offer a workable  and
affordable reinsurance complement  (see  Skees 1999 for further details).
The Focused Recommendation
Given  the  problems  with  the  existing  insurance  program  and  the  likely
limitations  of using weather insurance  directly with herders,  it becomes important  to
recap the overall problem.
/  It  is  logical  that  the  current  livestock  insurance  program  has  problems.
Given  the importance of understanding  the core  reasons for these problems,
the references  at the end were expanded to add other material  that highlights
the difficulty  of providing  agricultural  insurance  anywhere  in the world.  In
particularly  Skees  and  Barnett  go  into  many  of  these  practical  and
conceptual  problems.  Skees and Barnett provide much more detail about the
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supplying  individual  insurance.  Mongolia  has  unique  characteristics  that
make these core problems  even more challenging.
/  Multiple  and  complex  weather  conditions  create  the  dzud.  Actually
documenting  and understanding  these events is important for risk mitigation
and  early  warning  efforts.  However,  after  the  fact  the  events  are  not  as
important as the outcome - extremely high livestock losses.
An  attempt  to  construct  a  performance  checklist  will  help  the  discussion.
Table  1 makes  this  attempt  and  provides  a  subjective  assessment  for  each  of our
three alternatives.  These  assessments  are solely based on  professional judgment and
should not be taken  as the final word.  The table  is provided  as a quick guide to the
reader so that they can more fully understand  why  this paper recommends  the use of
mortality index insurance.
Table 1:  Subjective  Performance Assessments  for Alternative  Approaches
Performance Goals  Traditional  Weather  Mortality
Insurance  Insurance  Index
Insurance
Insurance should not  Fails  Pass  Pass
reward poor manages
Affordability for poor  No  Could be  Could be
herders
Effective risk protection  For the most  In some  Most likely
for individual herders  risky yes  cases
Focused on the most  No  Could be  Likely
significant covariant risk
Sustainable & profitable  Highly  Possible  Possible
for private companies  unlikely
Fits with other forms of  No  Possible  Possible
emergency  aid
Low transaction costs  No  Should be  Should be
Acceptance  from  Not likely  Should be  Can be
intentional risk sharing
markets
Opportunities  for well  With great  Possible  Possible
defined rolls for  care
government and markets
It is  clear that traditional  approaches  are  scored the  most  poorly.  A careful
reading of Skees and Bamett will give more insights into the basis for that judgment.
Traditional  insurance  scores  best  for  providing  specific  protection  to  individual
headers.  However,  in the current  system the most risky herders  who are in the most
risky  areas  will  receive  this  benefit  since  everyone  is  charged  the  same  flat  rate.
These  are  precisely  the  wrong  incentives  given  the  desire  to  motivate  herders  to
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due to  a major campaign  to educate  herders,  it is likely  that the major participants
would  be those  who are  most risky.  This could create  serious losses  for the pool,
especially  given  the  covariate  risk problem.  While  some  believe  that compulsory
insurance  will  fix  this  problem,  they  are  very  likely  mistaken.  Further,  it  is  ill
advised  to require  the best herd  managers  to  use their precious  cash for  insurance
that likely  will not work for their operation.  This only reduces their opportunity to
invest in more effective risk mitigation strategies.
Both the weather index  and mortality index  insurance  score better on several
criteria.  Weather insurance is unlikely to protect  against the great number of unique
weather conditions that can create a problem with livestock mortality.  This led to the
recommendation  to  pursue  insurance  mortality  rates  directly.  This  idea  is  also
limited  on  at  least  three  important  fronts:  1) an  individual  herder  who  is  a  good
manager  can have a loss and not get paid; 2) the quality of the mortality data might
change  once insurance  is being  sold based  on these  numbers;  and 3)  it will  still be
difficult  to  manage  the covariant  risk that  are  present  in  Mongolia.  Each of these
points  will  be  discussed  further  below.  Additionally,  some  very  careful  attention
must be paid to numerous details to have successful mortality index insurance.
Description of the mortality measure
The work by Enkh-Amgalan  used data from 36 sum for the period 1969-1999
on  mortality  rates  and  birth  rates4. These  data  are  fairly  reliable  and  afford  the
opportunity to performn  a rather complete analysis of the risk and the possibilities for
insuring based  on  mortality  rates  within each  sum.  The data were updated for the
years  1991-2000.
While statistics are developed for adult animals and offspring  within the year,  we
chose  to use the  adult mortality statistics  to develop  the  insurance index.  The census of
animals  is performed  every  year.  The mortality  rate is the  ratio of total  losses  of adult
animals divided by the number of animals reported in the end of the previous year census.
adultlosses
total  animals
Offspring losses are excluded on the following grounds:
1.  Compared  to  other age  groups  offspring  are  highly  vulnerable  and  loss  rates  are
usually high.  The offspring  loss rate  is calculated  as a ratio  of offspring  lost to  the
total number  of born.  When  losses associated  with  immature delivery  are  included,
the  losses  increase  further.  Therefore,  inclusion  of  offspring  losses  would
significantly increase the premium rates making it less likely that herders could afford
the insurance.
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2.  Recording  and  monitoring  of offspring  losses  are  more  difficult compared to  that of
adult  animals.  In  Mongolia,  statistics  on  animal  numbers  are based  on the  livestock
census data carried out in December each year. However,  data on offspring, which are
delivered  from  February  to June,  are  based  on reporting  during the  year,  which  are
less reliable than the final livestock census data.
3.  Inclusion  of  offspring  loss  rates  makes  the  calculation  of  the  loss  rate  more
complicated.  Calculation of the loss rate  as a ratio of total losses incorporating losses
of both adult animals  and offspring to the number of animals at the beginning of year
might  be  criticized  mathematically.  The number  of  offspring  does  not  have  direct
relationships  with the number of animals at the beginning  of year.  A  separate  index
relating  the  ratio of offspring  losses to the  total number of offspring  births might be
possible but is well beyond the scope of any recommendation  at the present time.
All  the  data  on  animal  numbers  at  the  beginning  of year  and  animal  losses  are
collected from the Central Statistics Board of Mongolia.  The process of collecting data is
quite involved  and has been in place  for well over thirty years.  Each sum has  records of
the  herder household  and animal  numbers  by species  for each household.  Sum and bag
governors  are responsible  for administering  the census and for maintaining these records
in good order.
Individual herders are responsible for reporting losses to the bag officials.  Losses
include  all  animals  that  have died  due  to dzud or other natural  disasters  (flash flooding
was mentioned as being  a problem as well).  Losses also include death of animals due to
disease,  theft  of animals,  and  animals  who  have  wondered  off during  storms  never  to
retum.  While  there may be some initial concem  about including all  of these numbers in
the  insurance  index,  since  this is  an  index  and not individual  insurance,  there  should be
no  real  problem.  The  theft  and lost animals  values  are  a relatively small  percentage  of
the total  number of animals  lost during a year.  Professionals  in the sum of Undurshireet
estimate the value at about  10% of the total number of losses.
Theft  is  rightly  considered  an  uninsurable  risk  in  the  current  system.  No  one
wants  to  encourage  herders  to  be  careless  in protecting  their  animals  from  thefts  or in
making certain  that animals  do not wonder off.  Offering insurance  based on the average
losses  for the sum or bag will not encourage  this behavior.  The  watchful  herder has the
same incentives  to be diligent since they will be paid only based on the sum average loss
rate.  By the  same  token,  the  negligent  herder  who allows  large  numbers  of animals  to
wonder off or be stolen  will not be compensated beyond the sum average  loss rate. Thus,
the  incentives  for  good  management  remain  soundly  in  place.  Furthermore,  the  theft
rates  are  likely  relatively  constant  from  year  to  year.  Thus,  their  inclusion  in  the
insurance index neither creates  an incentive problem nor a rate making  issue.  One would
not  want  theft  variation  to cause  rates  to  increase  since  the  index  is being  constructed
primarily to compensate  herders  for losses due to natural disasters and disease.
It is extremely  important  that the data  integrity be maintained.  It is also highly
significant that Mongolia does  a complete  census of all  animals  each  year.  This affords
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governors  give monthly  reports  on  livestock,  including  information  on  movement from
one sum to another.  Records  are kept of where the animals  have been moved.  Thus, by
all  counts,  it  should  be  quite  difficult  to  create  grossly  false  numbers  to  trigger  an
indemnity  payment.  Nonetheless,  it  is  reasonable  to  implement  an  outside  auditing
process  should  this  index  insurance  be  adopted.  Local  and  aimag  politics  may  still
provide  enough  incentives  to  government  officials  that  they may be  tempted  to  'create
losses'.  The  systems for developing  the census  and  the reporting of losses  are  standard
across  Mongolia.  These  systems  should  not be changed.  The  historic  records  are  the
basis for rating any index  on mortality rates.
The  only  recommended  modification  is  that  some  thought  be  given  to  using
auditors from nearby  aimags.  It would be better to have these professionals  involved for
a variety  of reasons:  1) local  officials  are  more likely  to trust and  cooperate  with  these
professionals  than someone  form  an  insurance  company  or the  national  government;  2)
these professionals  know the systems; and 3) they also have a stake in any potential fraud
that may be emerging within a particular region.  If anyone is 'creating losses'  it is likely
that the whole system will have to pay for such  fraud at some point.  Importantly,  the loss
experience  within region should be used for rate adjustment.  Thus, any cheating will  first
result in higher rates  in the region where the cheating occurs.  This,  of course, will be a
slow process  and should not be relied on to provide the only due diligence incentives.
How might mortality insurance  work?
The  sum of Saintsagaan  in the aimag  of Dundgobi  is used  to  illustrate  how
such mortality  insurance  may work.  There  were 2,800 cattle,  63,200  sheep, 43,300
goat, and  11,100  horses  in this sum in 2000.  This sum had extremely serious  losses
in 2000  with  the mortality  rate  on  cattle  at 72%;  sheep  at 41%;  goats  at  44%;  and
horses at  33%.  The simple  fact that each of these species  had serious  losses  in the
same  year  illustrates  the  covariant  risks  that  are  present  within  a  sum.  More
importantly  the  fact  that  many  other  sums  across  Mongolia  experienced  serious
losses  in the same year further makes the point about covariant  risk.  The correlation
of losses was strong among species with an aimag and across aimags.
Figure 1 and 2 show the  statistics for the 30 years of data for mortality rates
for  sheep  in  this  sum.  Sorting  the  30  years  of data  from  the  minimum  to  the
maximum  creates  the  cumulative  distributions.  Since  there  are  thirty  years,  each
year represents  a  1 in 30 frequency.  Thus,  the minimum value  is a  1/30  event, the
percentile  on  the  second  value  is  the  previous  value  +  1/30,  and  so on  until  the
maximum event is achieved  and set as  the  100'h percentile.  This  array can now be
used to establish  a number of possible triggers  that represent frequency  of the event.
Using frequency  to define a disaster is an important  criterion.  Public policy makers
should be able to relate to frequency.  In simple terms; How often does an event have
to occur before it is a disaster?  If one thinks  of living in  the desert,  the rainfall  is
always very low.  Noone  should decide that every  year is a disaster because it never
rains in the desert.  A  1 in 5 year event may be a reasonable trigger.  Such events  are
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enough  to  keep  herders  engaged  in  purchasing  the  insurance.  A  1 in  5  year
corresponds  to the 80th percentile.
Clearly  two  extreme  years  stand  out  in  the  sheep  mortality  data  for
Saintsagaan  sum:  1971  at  34%  and  2000  at 41%.  The  80h percentile  begins  at  a
more modest mortality rate of 6.5%,  which occurred in  1981.  The data appear below
for the 80th percentile  and above.  This contract would pay only for values above the
8 0th percentile, thus only values above 6.5% mortality would trigger a payment.  Any
number of contract  designs  can  be  considered.  Some of  these  will  be pursued  in
another section.
Percentile  Mortality  Year
80%  6.5  1981
83%  6.8  1994
87%  7.9  1980
90%  10.8  1977
93%  12.4  1993
97%  33.8  1971
100%  40.6  2000
A  contract  that  would  simply  pay  the  mortality  rate  times  the  value  of
liability  purchased  would  have an  average  payout  over the  30 years  of about 3.7%
(the sum  of the  positive  numbers  above  6.5%  divided  by the total  number of years
30).  This is a very  straightforward way to calculate  premium rates.  More complex
methods  would  need  to  be  implemented  should  a  program  be  constructed.  These
methods  would  rely on putting  more  structure into  the  assumptions  about the  shape
of  the parent  distribution.  Several  tests  were  performed  on  various  sum  data  sets.
The smoothed distribution  that is presented below  is  an example of the type of work
that  is  needed.  This  distribution  is  fitted  with  special  non-parametric  kernel
estimators.  More importantly,  one should consider fitting these type of distributions
by  sum  and  then  using  spatial  procedure  to  smooth  the  fitted  distributions  across
space.
Given that this is an index contract that pays based only on the data for the sum5, the
question  of insurable  risk becomes  the only significant  underwriting concern  for the
individual  herder. Even here it would not create significant problems  if herders  were
allowed  to purchase liability values  that are greater than  the value of their herd.  Use
of an example will make  the issues clear.  Let's assume that a herder has 500 sheep.
The value  of an  average  sheep  at the end of 2000 was  about Tg 22,000.  Thus, this
herder  might  purchase  an  insurance  policy  with  a value  of Tg  11  million.  If the
policy were rated at 4%, the herder would pay Tg 440,000.
5 One local sum leader from Undurshireet  liked the concept very much.  However,  he insisted that their data
was  good enough to offer such insurance  at the bag level and rightly  understood that offering the policy at
that level  would offer superior risk protection to the individual  herder.  The discussion quickly turned to
difference  in mortality rates among the four bag in Undurshireet for the 2000 dzud.Livestock Insurance in Mongolia  Page 13
Premium paid = liability x premium rate
Tg 440,000 =  Tg 11,000,000 x  .04
Figure 1: Smoothed  Mortality Rate for Sheep  in






LL  2 %
1%
0%-
0  10  20  30  40  50  60  70
Mortality RateLivestock Insurance in Mongolia  Page 14
Figure 1: Mortality Rates of Adult Sheep: Saintsagaan
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Again, the herder should be allowed to select any liability value within some
reasonable limits. Any lower value  should be allowed and  an upper bound of  150 to
200 percent  the  value of the  sheep herd may make  sense.  Allowing  any  value will
give  the  herder significant  choice  and  increase  the  likelihood  that  some  who  have
little cash can purchase  some level of insurance.  Obviously,  the sales agent needs to
make certain  that such decisions  are  made  with  full knowledge  of how  the payment
will be made.
The  fact  that  the  contract  integrity  is  not  a function  of  the  liability  for the
individual  herder is very  important.  It  also  means  that  the  value  of an  individual
species  is not nearly  as important as it is when  insuring the individual animal.  This
means  that  any  reasonable  number  can  be  used  to  value  livestock,  especially  if
herders  are  allowed  to  'scale  up'  on  the  contract  and  select  values  at  150  or  200
percent  of the average value of their herd.  Keep in mind that both rates  and payouts
are driven by the value insured  (liability).  The value  insured has  no impact on  the
outcome of the statistic (the sum or bag mortality rate).
The  payout  structure  for this  policy  in the  years  with  sum mortality  rates  at
6.5%  and above would be the product of the mortality rate and the liability.  Thus, in
2000 this herder would have the following payment calculation:
if mortality rate is > the strike level of 6.5% then
Payment = liability x mortality rate
Tg 4,466,000 = Tg 11,000,000 x  .406
By now  it should be clear that  this payment would be made to the individual
holding  this policy regardless  of the mortality rate for the individual  with the policy.
While  such  insurance  may seem strange  there are distinct advantages  of this type of
policy  and  there  is  ample  precedent  for  such  policies.  Skees,  Black,  and  Barnett
explain  the  motivation  and  design  for  the  U.S.  crop  insurance  program  that  is  an
index contract paying only when county yields drop below certain thresholds.
Besides  the  low  administrative  costs  and  the  lower  likelihood  of  abuse
associated  with  the contract,  a major advantage  of using the  mortality  rate is that  it
rewards  good  behavior.  Those  herders  who  have  been  successful  in  having  lower
mortality  rates  than  their neighbors  through  hard  work  and investments  during  the
year  to  mitigate  risk receive  the payment  based  on  the  average  losses  of  the  sum.
Those  who  have  greater  losses  still  receive  a  payment  in  the  years  that  are  bad.
However,  that  payment  gives  them  no  incentives  to  relax  in  trying  to  save  their
animals  since any  rate  of mortality  beyond  the  average  will  not be  paid.  Once  an
index  contract  system  is  in  place,  the  private  insurance  market  would  have  better
opportunities  to offer individual  insurance that pays for losses to individuals that are
beyond those paid by the sum or bag mortality policy.  Such individual insurance  will
now be more independent  in nature since the index contract will remove much of the
covariant  risk.  But  more  importantly,  the  private  sector  would  have  the  proper
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With  the  mortality  index  insurance  there  is  little  opportunity  for  adverse
selection  and  moral  hazard.  The  administrative  costs  should  be considerably  less
than  traditional  insurance.  Thus  the major loads that will be added  to the prernium
rates  will be  almost totally  a  function of the commission  paid  sales  agents  and the
premiums  that  are  needed to  build reserves  and pay reinsures  for the covariate  risk.
More  will  be said  about  these  important  issues  in  the next section.  Another  major
advantage  of  this  recommendation  is  that  quality  historical  data  exist  and  good
systems  are in place  to develop  these data  all across Mongolia.  There is no need to
start a new system.
How  might a contract appear to the herder?
While neither author is a lawyer, it may be helpful  to show how simple the
language might be for an index insurance contract with a herder in Saintsagaan.
DRAFT LANGUAGE FOR ILLUSTATION ONLY
This  insurance is  solely  based on  the  official  sum  statistics on  adult
livestock losses for cattle and yak in sum Saintsagaan  in aimag Dundgobi.
The  insurance will pay you  when  the mortality rate (the ratio of adult
losses during the year 2002 divided by  the total herd population at the
beginning of the year) exceeds a rate of 6.5%.  To be  eligible, you must
register for this  insurance by  May  1 of 2001.  Registration involves  a
statement of intent to purchase and a reporting of your animal numbers at
that time.
Value of  Insurance
While  we  believe  the  average value  of cattle and yak  to  be  about  Tg
100,000, you may purchase any value of insurance between Tg 20,000 and
Tg 200,000 per animal reported.
Paying Premium
You will pay a premium rate of 4% times the value of insurance  you chose.
The premium payment is due on January  1 of 2002.  Should no payment be
received by that time,  we will cancel this insurance  policy.
Paying  for losses:
If the  mortality rate for the  sum  of Saintsagaan in  aimag Dundgobi
exceeds 6.5%,  we will pay you the product of the mortality rate times the
value of insurance  you have chosen.  Please understand  that you may have
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Analysis of the Risk Profile Across  Mongolia
Data were  obtained for 36 sums with  at least one sum in nearly every aimag
in  Mongolia.  These  data  were  mostly  complete  for  cattle,  sheep,  and  goats  from
1969-2000  (year  1975  and 1979 are  missing).  Camel  and horse mortality rates were
obtained for  1991  to 2000.  Special  procedures were used to fill in the data series for
camels  and horses.  Regressions  of the following  form were  fit using the  available
data:
Camel Mortality,  = C  + b,x Cattle Mortality,  + b2x  Sheep  Mortalityt + b 3x Goat Mortality,
Horse Mortality, = C + b,x Cattle Mortality,  + b2 x Sheep Mortality,+ b3x Goat Mortalityt
where t = years  1991-2000.
These  regressions  had  reasonably high  R squared  values  and  for  those  few
that did  not,  a  simple procedure  was  used to  scale  the  cattle  mortality  in  the  same
fashion  as  existed  in  the  10  years  that  were  available  (the ratio  of camel  mortality
over cattle  mortality).  Missing  years  were replaced  with estimated  data. While  this
may  introduce  some  problems,  the likely  bias is in  the direction  of adding  slightly
too much covariate  risk.  The intent is  to get a complete  cost accounting  of offering
this insurance for all species in every sum and aimag in Mongolia.
Once the data adjustments  were complete, there was a complete matrix for all
five  species  for  each  of  the  30  years  and  in  each  aimag.  The  aimag  estimates
basically assume that all  sums  within the aimag will  have similar relative risk  as the
ones that were  available.  There  may be some spreading  of risk  within an  aimag that
are  not  reflected  using  this  approach.  However,  again  the  intent  it  to  give  some
indication of how a mortality index might perform across Mongolia.  The bias that is
introduced  with  the methods  employed  here is in the  right direction  for this  type  of
work.  The covariant risk will be slightly overstated due to this bias.
Given  the  matrix  of mortality  rates,  any number  of  index  policies  can  be
designed.  The 1999  value of number of head by aimag are used to represent value at
risk throughout the  time period.  This  is a common practice  to use today's  value  at
risk with  a time  series  of events  in order  to  model  the  losses.  Since  the  risks  are
spatial  in  nature it  is important  that  they  be  calculated  using  the current  values  at
risk.  This effectively  weights  the  risk spatially  by the  location  of the livestock  in
Mongolia.  The underlying  assumption is that the 30 years represent  the likely future
distribution  of events.  Also, using  the  actual  events  for the  30 years  maintains  the
spatial  correlation  among  aimags.  This  is  very  important  as  it  allows  for  a  more
complete  picture  of  the covariate  risk  across  Mongolia.  Again,  the  assumption,  as
with  most  statistical  data  work,  is  that  the  past  is  a  good  predictor  of  the  future.
There are no apparent trends in the mortality rate data.  And while 2000 and 2001 are
unusual  events,  there  are similar events  in longer series  of data for  Mongolia.  It is
too early to tell if there are any structural  changes that make Mongolia more risky for
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The matrix of mortality rates is 30 by 22 by 5 (30 years, by 22 aimags,  and 5
animal species).  The matrix for animal values is simply a 1 x 22 x 5  (1  = 1999
values  that are imposed over the 30 years, by 22 aimags, by 5 animal  species).  Value
at risk is calculated  as follows:
Value at riska,  = Number of animals in 19 9 9 a,  * Average value of animal  in 2000
where  a = aimag and
s = animal  species
Animal Values Used  in the Analysis
Species  Value  (Tg)





Given  these calculations,  the estimated  value for all  livestock  in Mongolia  is  about
Tg  1.1 trillion  (see table 3).  If the policy were made available  at an average  premium rate of
3%,  the  total  premium  would  equal  about  Tg  32.8  billion.  This  also  makes  the  strong
assumption that all livestock would be insured at the full value.  The analysis  will make this
assumption to give the full scope of this  insurance.  However,  it is quite simple to factor all
numbers down with any assumption one wishes to make about  the rate of participation.  For
example,  at 10% participation  the premium would equal Tg 3.3 billion.
To  begin  the  analysis  it  was  assumed  that  the  premium  rates  would  need  to  be
loaded  at  least  by about  40%6.  Further,  a  target  of about  3%  average  premium  rates  was
used.  Therefore,  the contracts  needed  to set  the coverage  or trigger mortality  rates for each
aimag  and  species  so  that  the  average  pure  premium  (before  loads)  would  equal  roughly
2.15%.  There  will be variations  around this rate and these are reported in summary  statistics
below to give some idea of the relative risk across aimags.
The trigger values  were  set by each animal species  so that the average pure premium
rates  would  equal  the  target  of  2.15%.  To  accomplish  this  task  the  following  strike
percentiles  were  used  by  species;  1) cattle  =  86%;  2)  sheep  and  goats  =  80%;  3)  camel  =
76%; and 4) horses = 70%.  The contract design used the principle  of paying at the mortality
rate  for  values  above  the  strike.  The  strike  mortality  values  are  reported  in  Table  4.
Corresponding  values of the insurance or the pure premium rates are reported  in Table 5.  As
is  quite  evident  there  are  large  differences  across  Mongolia  for  these  risks.  The  pure
premium  rates  are  each  multiplied  by  1.4  to  load  for  some  administrative  costs  and  for
reinsurance.  Should  a  mortality  index  insurance  be constructed  one would  want  to put the
structure of parent distributions in place and not have as large of differences  in the premium
rates across Mongolia.  Still,  the  differences  are important  as they do reflect the  risk profile
of the country.
6 This  load is likely low.  However, a lower number is used with the assumption that the factors that cause
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Table 3: Values of livestock  used by Aimag (all values are in Tg 1 Million)
Aimag  Cattle  Sheep  Goat  Camel  Horse
Arhangi  46,400  12,122  14,294  100  20,860
Bayan-Oligii  11,400  11,352  9,030  800  5,530
Bayanhongor  19,800  26,378  12,292  4,000  11,200
Bulgan  26,400  7,392  11,172  100  14,700
Darhan_UnI  3,300  946  1,260  500  17,640
Domod  14,600  2,728  6,048  600  7,280
Dornogobi  10,400  8,272  6,678  3,000  8,610
Dundgobi  12,700  16,874  13,538  50  1,050
Gobi-Altai  7,900  22,638  12,138  3,500  7,280
Govisumber  1,400  924  896  10  1,540
Hentii  22,900  7,788  9,492  2,500  7,560
Hovd  15,100  17,512  11,032  400  21,280
Hovsgol  48,200  14,938  14,000  2,300  8,120
Omnogobi  4,000  19,976  6,216  1,900  20,160
Orhon  2,800  990  1,106  10  910
Ovorhangii  29,600  20,460  19,922  1,100  13,440
Selenge  11,000  3,036  4,592  10  910
Suhbaatar  21,100  7,678  9,660  9,900  8,330
Tov  24,100  10,868  16,450  1,300  13,160
Ulaanbaatar  5,300  1,210  1,540  700  13,580
Uvs  16,800  13,420  13,622  100  3,220
Zauhan  27,100  15,268  17,696  2,800  15,190
Figure 1:  Map of Share of Livestock by Aimag as a Percent of Total Country Value
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To illustrate the relative  risk across Mongolia  in more  detail,  a special  analysis  was
performed that fixed the average strike for each aimag  at the average  value for each  species.
Thus, all  aimag  would begin making payments  at the  same  mortality rates. Those  rates  are:
1) 9.1% for cattle;  2) 6.2%  for sheep;  3)  6.5% for goats; 4) 5.6%  for camels; and 5)  3.2% for
horses.  This  relative  position  of these  values  also  shows  the  relative  risk  for  different
species.  The pure premium averages about 2.5% for each of these species of livestock.
Loss cost =  pay
E Liability
the  sum  of  all  payouts  for  all  years  and  all  species  is  simply  divided  by  the  sum  of all
liabilities  for all  species and  years.  This  normalizes  the risk  picture and  allows for a  more
appropriate  comparison  of  the relative  risk  position  of  the different  aimags  given  today's
livestock values.
Figure  3 shows  large differences  in the relative  risk of the  various aimags  -
from about  1% to 5% given these strikes and the insurance  design.  This table can be
used for a variety of purposes  as it reflects  the current  risk profile given  the relative
risk different livestock in the different aimags with the current values at risk.
Given  the principles  laid out above  it is possible to  develop  estimates of the
30  year  loss  experience  for  a  book  of  business  that  is  equally  spread  across
Mongolia.  This analysis  has driven the data and procedures described above toLivestock Insurance in Mongolia  Page 21
Figure 3:  Risk ranking of aimags for all livestock  species using the same strike
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create Tables 3-5.  Loss ratio is the experience within a given year. Such data give a
good estimate of the covariate risk that remains after pooling the risk across aimags
and species.
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Table 4:  Mortality Strike Values Used - By Aimag and Species
Aimag  Cattle  Sheep  Goat  Camel  Horse
Arhangi  6.0%  7.5%  7.2%  3.8%  1.4%
Bayan-Oligii  20.1%  4.8%  6.7%  3.0%  3.4%
Bayanhongor  9.2%  7.2%  7.5%  4.3%  3.8%
Bulgan  5.4%  6.3%  6.4%  6.9%  3.1%
Darhan_Unl  8.2%  6.1%  6.5%  5.4%  4.1%
Dornod  11.8%  9.2%  12.4%  8.9%  4.2%
Dornogobi  8.9%  5.9%  5.8%  7.2%  2.9%
Dundgobi  10.5%  6.5%  7.8%  6.1%  5.2%
Gobi-Altai  7.0%  4.9%  4.8%  3.0%  3.6%
Govisumber  8.2%  6.1%  6.5%  5.4%  4.1%
Hentii  6.3%  7.9%  8.1%  6.0%  3.1%
Hovd  6.4%  7.1%  5.0%  3.7%  4.4%
Hovsgol  4.3%  7.0%  6.3%  2.9%  1.9%
Omnogobi  9.9%  5.4%  6.3%  2.8%  2.2%
Orhon  8.2%  6.1%  6.5%  5.4%  4.1%
Ovorhangii  10.1%  7.9%  7.9%  5.3%  6.3%
Selenge  7.0%  6.7%  6.9%  8.4%  3.5%
Suhbaatar  14.2%  9.7%  11.6%  7.5%  3.2%
Tov  10.5%  6.6%  6.4%  8.1%  3.1%
Ulaanbaatar  10.5%  6.6%  6.4%  8.1%  3.1%
Uvs  10.6%  6.4%  6.9%  7.5%  9.5%
Zauhan  6.5%  5.8%  5.1%  3.8%  3.6%
Table 5: Pure Premium Rates By Aimag and Species
Aimag  Cattle  Sheep  Goat  Camel  Horse
Arhangi  1.1  2.2  2.1  1.2  0.7
Bayan-Oligii  3.8  2.7  3  2.4  2.5
Bayanhongor  2  1.9  2  1.7  2.2
Bulgan  0.8  1.9  1.9  3.2  1.3
Darhan_Unl  1.6  1.6  1.7  1.5  1.8
Dornod  2.2  3  4.3  3.1  2.4
Dornogobi  1.3  1.5  1.5  1.8  1
Dundgobi  5.9  3.7  4.1  3.5  4.3
Gobi-Altai  1.3  1.3  1.1  1.3  1.8
Govisumber  1.6  1.6  1.7  1.5  1.8
Hentii  1.8  2.3  2.2  2.4  1.7
Hovd  1.5  2.1  2.2  1.4  2.6
Hovsgol  1.2  3  2.6  1.4  1.1
Omnogobi  2.2  1.4  1.6  1.4  1.9
Orhon  1.6  1.6  1.7  1.5  1.8
Ovorhangii  2.6  2.5  2.2  2  3.8
Selenge  1.5  1.9  1.5  3  1.5
Suhbaatar  2.1  2.5  3.3  3.1  1.9
Tov  3  2.2  1.8  3.4  1.9
Ulaanbaatar  3  2.2  1.8  3.4  1.9
Uvs  2.8  1.8  2.2  2.1  4.6
Zauhan  2.9  1.9  1.8  1.7  2.3Livestock Insurance in Mongolia  Page 24
In  essence  any  value  greater  than  100  suggests  that premiums  in  that  year
would  not  cover  the  payouts.  As  one  would  expect,  the  aggregate  values  are
generally  lower  than  some  of  the  values  by  species.  While  there  is  some  risk
spreading and diversification,  there remain some serious  losses.  The year 2000
exceeds  400  %  loss ratio.  The  next  worse  year is  1969  at 357%.  Another  way  to
highlight the bad years is to show excess  losses as is done in figure 4.
At  this  stage  all  the  information  that  is  needed  to  operate  an  insurance
company  to insure all species in every  aimag of Mongolia is organized.  To simplify
things,  we return  to some basic principles and use some rounded numbers.  It is very
important to understand  that this analysis  is being performed  to give insights into the
overall risk profile in Mongolia and to spur thinking about what the actual cost might
be to run a complete  insurance  program using the mortality  index insurance.  Above
all,  the  methods  for reinsurance  and  administrative  cost are not recommendations.
They  are  simple  abstractions  designed  to  motivate  thinking  and  give  the  needed
insights.
We  assume  that the total  liability for the insurance  company is Tg  1 Trillion
(note the value in the work above is Tg  1.09).  We use the average  pure premium rate
that is 2.15%.  With  a load of 40 percent,  the premium at would be very close to 3%.
Again,  another  simplifying  assumption  is that  this insurance  company  will  ask  an
international reinsurer to pay for all losses beyond those that can not be covered with
the  unloaded  pure  premium.  Table  7  gives  the complete  profile  of how  this  might
work.  The  pure  premium  value  is  roughly  Tg  21.5  billion.  Our  hypothetical
Mongolian  insurance  company pays  this  sum first  and  then  any losses  beyond  that
point would be paid in a simple stop  loss by an international  reinsurer.  The column
"Reinsure Pays" gives the estimated payments under this system.  These average Tg
9.1  billion  per  year.  Since  the  pure  premium  is  used  the  net receipts  before  any
expense  beyond pure premium for the company also  average Tg 9.1  billion per year.
These measures  are an  excellent proxy  for the  degree of covariant  risk that remains
in the system.
It  is  assumed  that  with  this  type  of  primary  insurance  and  with  some
opportunities  for  added  efficiency  in  weather  markets,  the  reinsurance  can  be
negotiated  at  a  favorable  rate.  For  simplicity  and  given  this  assumption,  the  pure
reinsurance  cost  of  Tg  9.1  billion  is  loaded  by  50%.  Thus  the  annual  cost  for
international  reinsurance is set at Tg 13.5 billion (9.1 x  1.5).
Given  our structure of reinsurance,  it  is now  possible to  determine  how the
rest of the  funds  may be spent.  First,  we return  to the pure premium  and load that
value by 40%:  21.5 x 1.4  = Tg 30 Billion.  Next we account for the average  value of
the indemnities that the insurance company  must pay:  21.5 - 9.1  =  12.5.  Finally,  we
assume  the  residual  premium  income  is  available  for  all  remaining  cost  (profits,
administrative  costs,  etc.).  This  value  is  about  14%  of the  loaded  premium  and
should reasonable.  Some may be concerned that this is a low value.  However,  keepLivestock Insurance in Mongolia  Page 25
Table 6:  Estimates Annual Loss Ratios for All Species  Given Pure Premiums
Aggreate  Cattle  Sheep  Goat  Camel
Loss Ratio  Loss  Ratio  Loss Ratio  Loss Ratio  Loss Ratio
1969,1  357  453  272  254  330  404
F19 70-  i  82  86  45  77  72  128
'197.1  288  309  267  327  280  235
48  0  90  102  25  28
69  10  90  126  34  94
i1974~  -24  0  30  79  13  0
;1  i976C  46  0  87  107  5  19
~1977-j  282  227  389  327  145  228
1978  0  0  0  0  0  0
1e98  -;  107  115  80  101  273  103
i981.  52  72  18  35  28  81
19'82'-!  44  68  0  15  204  55
I98 39  252  231  259  253  383  255
1984i  45  0  96  65  31  44
:i985,  85  29  130  167  60  45
47  10  100  70  40  24
'1987'~  - - 60  51  64  67  209  35
|  98~-  68  46  66  122  69  50
I1989; . 0  0  0  0  0  0
199V0  79  61  110  109  62  44
1991s,  69  58  64  61  169  84
,i992,..  44  47  17  13  69  100
1993.  241  316  213  121  162  287
1994  1-  74  88  80  25  176  77
1995  13  0  16  0  109  32
1996  5  0  0  0  0  26
-1997  57  44  78  34  2  90
1998:,  12  0  20  23  14  13
k 999:L]  @-6  7  0  0  0  18
2000  434  663  307  308  24  386
in mind that the primary administrative cost is marketing and sales, collecting
premiums, and making indemnity payments.  All other statistics and loss adjustments
should occur within the existing system.  Thus, 14%  may be well within the range of
the cost needed.  The total annual average position of the Mongolian insurance
company follows:
V  *Load premium by 40% to pay for other cost
/  *2.15 x 1.4 = 3%  premium rate
/  *Revenue  =  Tg 30 Billion premium
/  *Reinsurance  =  Tg 13.6 B
/  *Loss paid by insurer  =  Tg 12.4 B
/  -AIl  other costs  =  Tg  4.0 BLivestock  Insurance in Mongolia  Page 26
Table 7:Balance sheet activities for hypothetical insurance company
Overall  Pure  Co. Pure
Year  Pure Loss  Payouts or  Premium  Reinsurer  Prem less  s:IOJIIII
Ratio  Indemnities  less  Indemniities  Payments  Indemnities  :ljiutiii
1969  357%  76.8  (55.3)  -55.3  0  -9.1
1970  83%  17.8  3.7  0.0  3.7  -5.4
1971  289%  62.0  (40.6)  -40.6  0.0  -9.1
1972  48%  10.3  11.2  0.0  11.2  2.1
1973  70%  15.0  6.5  0.0  6.5  -2.5
1974  24%  5.2  16.3  0.0  16.3  7.3
1976  46%  9.9  11.6  0.0  11.6  2.5
1977  283%  60.7  (39.2)  -39.2  0.0  -9.1
1978  0%  - 21.5  0.0  21.5  12.4
1980  108%  23.2  (1.7)  -1.7  0.0  -9.1
1981  53%  11.3  10.2  0.0  10.2  1.1
1982  44%  9.5  12.0  0.0  12.0  2.9
1983  252%  54.2  (32.7)  -32.7  0.0  -9.1
1984  45%  9.7  11.8  0.0  11.8  2.8
1985  85%  18.3  3.2  0.0  3.2  -5.9
1986  47%  10.1  11.4  0.0  11.4  2.3
1987  60%  12.9  8.5  0.0  8.5  -0.5
1988  68%  14.7  6.8  0.0  6.8  -2.3
1989  0%  - 21.5  0.0  21.5  12.4
1990  79%  17.0  4.4  0.0  4.4  -4.6
1991  69%  14.9  6.6  0.0  6.6  -2.4
1992  45%  9.6  11.9  0.0  11.9  2.8
1993  242%  51.9  (30.4)  -30.4  0.0  -9.1
1994  75%  16.0  5.5  0.0  5.5  -3.6
1995  14%  2.9  18.5  0.0  18.5  9.5
1996  5%  1.1  20.4  0.0  20.4  11.3
1997  57%  12.3  9.2  0.0  9.2  0.2
1998  13%  2.7  18.8  0.0  18.8  9.7
1999  6%  1.3  20.2  0.0  20.2  11.1
2000  434%  93.3  (71.8)  -71.8  0.0  -9.1
Averages can  be deceptive  however.  The net position of the values  above is zero.
Table 7  provides  a clear  indication  that there  is great  variation  around  zero.  When  the
losses exceed  the  pure  premium,  the insurance  company  will  pay out Tg 9.1  billion.  In
the  years  when there  are no payments,  the net gain  will be Tg  12.4  billion.  Clearly  our
insurance  company  must  have  capital  reserves  to  manage  the  risk  that  remain.
Nonetheless, the system designed  here does limit the losses.
An Alternative Payout Structure
One  concern  with the  contract  designed  above  is  that once  the trigger mortality
rate  is crossed there would  be a payment at that rate.  This may encourage  moral hazard
on the  part of the officials  who  are developing  the  statistics for mortality  rates.  If they
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making certain that the values will trigger a payment.  This incentive is stronger given the
fact that levels of payment  are high once the trigger is crossed.  An  alternative  to reduce
these  incentives  would  be  to  scale  the  payments  in  once  the  trigger  is  crossed.  For
example,  if the  trigger were  set at  a  10%  mortality  rate, each  1 percentage  point above
that  level  could  be  considered  what  is  referred  to  as  a  'tick'  and  a certain  level  of
payment could be tied to each  'tick'.
With  a tick system, payments  would only begin when  the mortality rate is equal  to
1  1% and they would be made more gradually.  For example, if the corresponding  value at
risk  for  cattle  is  100,000  Tg  and  a  herder  has  100  cattle,  they  would  want  insurance
values  of 10,000,000  Tg.  If we consider that the maximum  mortality rate in  a sum may
be  60%,  then  we  have  50  ticks  between  the  trigger  value  of  10%  and  60%.  We  can
divide  the  10,000,000  Tg by 50 ticks  to get  a value  per tick  of 2,000,000  Tg.  Thus,  at
11%  mortality the  herder with  100  cattle would  receive  2,000,000  Tg.  If the  mortality
rate is  12%, the payment would be 4,000,000  Tg, and so on.
Payment = (Mortality rate - Trigger) x Tick Value
=  (12%  - 10%) x 2,000,000.
This system  may  also  be more easily explained  to  a herder.  The explanation  is
simply  - for each  point  above  the trigger  you  will  receive  a payment  of  2 million  Tg.
Premium  rates  and  all  other  considerations  could  be recalculated  using  procedures  that
are similar to those presented  above with the new payout rules.
Other Considerations
Concerns Regarding  Ability to Predict  Bad Years
A  number  of  other  considerations  should  be  discussed.  The  ability  of  both
herders  and insurers to know  something about the risk of livestock losses in the coming
year is a problem.  Everyone  agrees that in  a very dry summer when grass  does not grow
to adequate  height, the likelihood that heavy snow will  cover the  grass and create a dzud
is much greater.  Thus, either party can use this information  in a fashion that is  harmful to
the intent.  For example, the insurer may decide  not to offer insurance  given this type of
season prior to  winter.  By the  same  token  the herder may  decide  that this  is  the year  to
purchase the insurance whereas in other years they do not.  This is intra-temporal  adverse
selection.  Either form of behavior is undesirable.  The rates  could be adjusted from year
to year.  However,  this is cumbersome  and would likely  lower participation  in precisely
the years when it is needed.
Recommendation:  Offering  a three-year  sequentially  updated  contract  may be  the  best
option  to deal with the knowledge  that is available  about likely losses well in advance of
the year beginning.  The herder would sign a contract  stating that they would be obligated
to pay the premium in January for each of the next three years.  A renewal of the contract
in the  following  year would also obligate  the herder for three  more years.  The contract
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cancel.  This would prevent either the herder or the insurer from changing their behavior
when information  going  into  the winter  gives  an  indication  of the  likely  loss.  Premium
surcharges  could  be  imposed  for  herders  who  chose  to  take  only  a  one-year  contract.
Other penalties may be in order for herders  who cancel before the contract expires.
A dual Payment System
Recommendation: Given  that most dzud create  the serious livestock losses  in the spring,
it may be possible  to structure a dual payment  system.  A  preliminary  payment could be
made  in  June  when  conditions  clearly  show  that  a  serious  loss  has  occurred.  The
remaining payment would be made at the end of the year.
Linkages to micro-finance
In  discussions  with  herders  we  asked  about  the  nature  of  collaboration  they  engage  in
with neighbors,  farmer  associations,  cooperatives,  etc.  While  the herders  we visited did
not  belong  to  associations  or  cooperatives,  they  were  involved  with  their  extended
families  and neighbors  in  a number of joint activities.  We described  a concept  whereby
they might  collaborate  with  these same  neighbors  in buying  the mortality  index.  In this
fashion,  they  could  each  buy  the index  based  on  their  own herds  and then  collectively
decide  who  among  them  needed  the  most  assistance  when  the  index  paid.  Such
agreement  would need  to be worked out early and negotiated  as the event occurred.  The
herders  we  visited  felt  that  this  was  workable  and  something  they  may  consider.  In
effect,  such  an  arrangement  would  be like  a mutual  insurance  that could even  be turned
into an effective  micro-finance  group.  If a group of herders  in the same region  had such
arrangements,  some of the emerging  micro-finance  banks may be  willing to make loans
to the group or to individuals  in the group.  The index contract  should remove the major
risk that these herders face.
More  formal  structures  could  also  be  facilitated  under  the  micro-finance
component  of the World Bank  and FAO  projects.  Farmer  associations  or cooperatives
could be encouraged  to follow  this model with  the promise  of loans.  The goal  would be
to  get  these  associations  to  begin  to  offer  these  services  of  collective  and  mutual
insurance  coupled with micro-finance  loans.  The mortality index contract could be a key
component  of this activity.
Linkages to Community Investment Funds
When  visiting  with  sum  officials  about  how  such  index  contracts  could  and
should be  sold  to  others  who  have  value  at risk  when  there  is a  livestock  disaster,  the
immediate question was 'could the sum purchase  such a contract?'  The answer should be
yes.  Sum  governments  undoubtedly  suffer  fiscally  when  there  is  a  major  loss  in
livestock.  In  addition,  they  are  struggling  to  provide  assistance  to families  in  the  sum
who  have suffered  the  most.  Thus,  one  can  envision  allowing  the  sum  government  to
purchase this insurance.  It would be a clear indicator of problems  and it is scaled  in such
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community  investment  funds  might  be used  by sums  to  purchase  these contracts.  The
important  issue  for the  community  is  what  are  the  relative  costs  of purchasing  these
contracts  versus holding some fiscal reserves for these type of livestock disasters?
Given  the design of these contracts,  there is every reason  to allow  any entity that
has  an  insurable  risk to  purchase  a mortality  index  contract.  This would  not create  an
underwriting problem and it cannot create extra losses since it is an index.  The banks and
input  supplies  may  be  interested  in  directly  purchasing  this  contract.  Both  have  a
portfolio of risk that is directly tied to the well being of the herders.  Many others in the
community  may also have their income and well-being directly  tied to the well-being  of
the herders.
Alternative Roles for Government
What is presented here  are some  basic  ideas.  There  are many possible  roles for
government.  Until  there  is  more  interaction  with  policy  makers  and  others  about  the
desired  course of action,  it is premature  to develop  this much  beyond  some  basic ideas.
Work  performed  for the  government  of Argentina  could  be used  as a basic  model  for
government  role.  The  key  aspect  of whatever  role the  government  plays  is  that  it be
limited  and  that  it  be structured  to  spur  private  insurance  markets  without  giving  the
insurance markets too much opportunity for rent seeking.
A  number  of alternative  roles  for government  are  possible.  At one  end of the
spectrum,  the  only  involvement  may be  to continue to support development  of the  loss
data and the census coupled  with the appropriate  regulatory framework that allows these
index contracts  to be developed  and sold by the private  sector.  At the other end of the
spectrum,  a relatively  basic  (and low  value)  index  contract  could  be sold  and reinsured
directly  by  the  government  in  such  a  fashion  that  would  facilitate  some  catastrophe
protection  for  herders  and at  the  same  time  spur  private  insurance  companies  to offer
additional  insurance  coverage.  No  matter  what  course  is  taken  the  government  must
remain  involved  in  developing  the  loss  data  and  the  census  population.  This
infrastructure  is key to the success of this concept.
If  the  government  could  afford  to  make  this  index  insurance  available  to  all
herders  at  a pure  premium  rate,  the  total  cost  to  the government  may  be  about  Tg  10
billion.  Under such conditions,  the  herder would pay for a basic policy  with premiums
that just equal  the expected  payouts  (indemnities).  The government  would pay for the
reinsurance  and  the  administrative  cost.  If such  an  approach  were  tried  it  would  be
critical  to  offer  insurance  only  at  the  expected  value  of  the  animals  for  the  basic
government  policy.  Further, it  would be important  to create incentives  for the private
insurers to offer more insurance.  For example the private companies  could be allowed to
sell the government insurance  only if they offered some additional value.  Otherwise,  the
basic policy would  be available  for herders  who  want  no more  insurance  coverage  than
what  is  provided  with  the  government  policy.  Other  delivery  channels  for the  basic
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Once  the basic policy was in place, much  of the covariant risk would be removed
from the market.  The private companies  could offer individual insurance  that would pay
for losses not paid for by the basic policy.  For example, once the index policy payment is
made,  herders  could  file  a  claim  for  any  remaining  losses  suffered  that  are  not  paid.
Another  policy could  be offered  at a  lower  level  or  layer of  risk.  For example,  if the
basic policy begins paying for mortality rates above  10%, the private policy could pay for
mortality  rates between  7%  and  10%.  With this type of layer,  the covariant  risk would
not be nearly  as  serious  as  for the upper  layer  (the  basic  policy  pays  the  upper layer -
losses between  10% and  100%).
Conclusion
The  need  to  carefully  consider  how  livestock  insurance  may  influence  the
incentives of herders  in Mongolia is significant.  The overriding  goal  of maintaining
and enhancing the risk mitigation  strategies used by Mongolia  herders mandates  that
careful thought be given  to how livestock  insurance  might be structured.  This report
has  provided  some  thinking  to  that end.  This is  at the  core of the  recommendation
that a livestock  mortality  index  be used to provide insurance  on  a sum or bag level.
Such  insurance  would  pay  every  herder  based  on  the  mortality  levels  within  the
region,  regardless  of  the  individual  herder  losses.  Consequently,  the  individual
herder  who works  hard to sustain  their livestock during  a dzud would be  rewarded.
By the same token, the herder who  does not work  to sustain their livestock will only
be compensated  at  the  losses for the  community.  This  system  will  not reward  the
herder who has heavy losses when  the community does not.  Using the area mortality
index  to  pay  nearly  eliminates  moral  hazard  and  adverse  selection.  The  major
concern will be to maintain quality statistics  for mortality rates.
Even  if a mortality index  is used,  this study also reveals the high  level of co-
variate  risk that would remain.  The models  developed  here  highlight  the  need  for
risk  sharing  in  the  international  community.  Just  how  that  risk  is -shared  would
depend  heavily  on  the  ultimate  structure  of  government  involvement  in  providing
some  level of reinsurance.  In early  stages  some level  of government involvement  is
needed  to spread the risk across Mongolia to the extent  possible.  However, this role
should  be as  a risk aggregator  only so that private  providers can  combine  their risk
with others across Mongolia.
Should  there  be  a desire  to  proceed  with  a pilot  test of the  mortality  insurance
concept,  there  are  a number  of additional  items  that  would need  attention  as  first steps.
These  steps  should  be  taken  to  test  the  feasibility  and  acceptability  of mortality  index
insurance. Some basic considerations and next steps follow:
1.  Collect  data on  mortality and adult livestock  numbers for  more sum;  make
certain  that  these  data  are  complete  for  all  species  of livestock  for  at  least  30
years;  create  a data set for as many sum  as  possible  but, at  a minimum,  obtain  a
geographic  spread of sum within  a aimag  and complete  at least five sum for each
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2.  Investigate  in some  detail the statistical system that is being  used to develop
the  census  of  animals  and  the  reporting  of  mortality  of  animals.  This
investigation  should be conducted with a clear picture of how these data might be
used  to make insurance  payments.  A number of issues should be investigated:  1)
what is the quality of these data? 2) Could the data be developed at the bag level?
3)  Has  the process for developing  the data changed in any  significant  fashion  in
the  last  30  years?  4)  Have the  data been  used  in  the  past  to  make  emergency
disaster  payments  and,  if  so,  is  there  any  evidence  that  this  created  any
misrepresentation  in the data?  5)  Given that a census is taken every year, are there
adequate  safeguards  and accounting  systems  in place  to mitigate the  opportunity
for manipulating the data? 6) What auditing systems might be added to assure that
the data process  does not change  when  a insurance  payments are being made on
the basis of the data? 7) How do herders  and others view the quality of the data?
3.  Select  a  sample  of  sum to  offer  the mortality  index  insurance.  Initially,  the
government could collaborate  with the private insurers and make insurance  offers
in a select sample of sum.  The sample should be selected with some geographical
spread  in mind.  Ideally,  the offers  would be made in about 30 sum.  Given  that
the  mortality  data  are  widely  available,  it  may  be  possible  to  make  select  a
representative  sum in every  aimag to begin the pilot.  This  would give as much
geographic  spread  as possible  and provide the needed publicity  across  Mongolia
for the concept.  Great care should be taken in making certain that the price that is
charged  reflects  the  relative  risk.  The premium  rates  charged  herders  and  the
design of the contracts  should be consistent with  market principles.  Initially,  the
government  could  provide  some  level  of reinsurance  to  private  provides  to  get
their  involvement.  Simultaneously,  the  concept  and  pilot  design  should  be
presented to the international  capital markets obtaining their input and attempting
to get their involvement in offering reinsurance.
4.  Develop  an extended  education and marketing program.  Any successful  pilot
must educate herders  about the potential  value and use of this insurance.  Some
considerable  attention should be paid to an educational effort.
5.  Establish appropriate feedback  and monitoring of the pilot.  A pilot program
should be  designed to allow  for learning  about the concept.  This learning  must
involve  a number of dimensions:  a) how have the private insurers respond to the
opportunity?  b)  how have the  herders responded?  c)  are herders  thinking of and
using informal  and  formal  mechanisms  to share  the  index  payments  within  the
community?  d)  has  the  introduction  of  the  index  insurance  changed  the  data
development process in any significant fashion?
In  a pilot test, one may attempt to offset the cost of the insurance  to herders
so that herders  would just pay the pure premium of the program. This would require
some  budget  obviously.  Additional  financing  would  be  needed  for resources  to
examine  the  issues  outlined  above  and for  education  and  marketing.  Thus,  careful
thought  must be  made  as  to  the  scope  of a  pilot  and  the  total  amount  of funds
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Main articles of the draft law  on livestock  insurance
1. Purpose of the law
1.1  Purpose  of  this  law  is  to  regulate  the  relationships  between  insurance  companies,
citizens and legal bodies on compulsory  insurance of livestock
4. Scope  and forms of livestock  insurance
4.1  Livestock insurance  can be compulsory and voluntary
4.2 Citizens and legal bodies  shall insure  breeding animals  and young animals to replace
aged breeding animals on a compulsory basis
/There  were proposals from Mongol Daatgal  company  and Tushig Daatgal company  that
livestock  insurance  should cover all  animals not only  breeding but this was not accepted
in the final draft/
5. Livestock  insurance
5.1 Livestock  shall be insured on a compulsory basis against the following  risks:
5.1.1 Drought and dzud
5.1.2 Sudden disasters  such as flood, strong storns, cold showers, fires
5.1.3 A class contagious  diseases
5.1.4 some serious diseases in B and C classes
6. Insurance agreement and guarantee
6.1  Livestock insurance  agreement  and guarantees  shall  be regulated  by the  articles  9.1
and 9.2 of the Law on Insurance.
6.3 Livestock insurance  agreement shall be based on the livestock census  data at the end
of year and shall be established by 1 April.
6.4 An insurance company  can partly or wholly reinsure  livestock risks by domestic  and
international companies.
7. Insurance duration
7.1  The duration of livestock insurance  agreement  shall be for 365 days  since the date of
signing.
8. Insurance value and premiums
8.1  Value of animals insured shall be established through negotiations between  2 parties
7
8.2 Premium for compulsory livestock insurance shall be 2% of the value7.
8.3 Premium shall be paid by 1 April in cash.
9. Insurance indemnities
9.1  Citizens and legal bodies  shall report about animal losses within 72 hours in cases of
sudden disasters  and 2 times per month during droughts  and dzuds.
7 There  was some indication that the 2% value had been increased to 4%.  However, this is not confirmed.
Even 4% is unlikely adequate to support a totally private  market policy  with the coverage outlined in
Appendix A.  Someone  inside the Ministry has done some analysis on this issue.  However,  we were ner
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9.2 Working group  in charge of identifying and certifying reasons, scope and duration of
events  that caused animal  losses  shall be  appointed  by sum Governors.  Working  group
shall be  composed  of representatives  of insurance  companies,  citizens  and legal  bodies
/clients/, livestock expert,  weather expert and other relevant bodies.
9.3 Whether the event can be considered,  as drought and dzud shall  be determined by the
Government.
9.4  Insurance  companies  shall  disburse  indemnities  within  30  days  from  the  date  of
conclusion by the Working group.
9.5  Indemnities  shall  by  determined  on  the  following  rate  based  on  the  value  under
insurance:
9.5.1  100% for sudden disasters, 70% for droughts  and dzuds
9.5.2 100%  for A class diseases, 80% for B and C class diseases.
9.6 Relationships  regarding  indemnities  shall be regulated by articles  13.1-13.6,  13.5.5,
13.9-13.10,  13.12-13.15  of the Law on Insurance.
9.7 Insurance companies shall not pay indemnities in the following cases:
9.7.1 Livestock losses due reasons not indicated in the Agreement
9.7.2  Due  to  failures  by  citizens  and  legal  bodies  to timely  report  animal  losses  and
resulting impossibility to determine reasons and scope of losses
9.7.3 Duration  of agreement /insurance/ is expired
10. Concessions  on insurance premiums
10.1 In cases of citizens  and legal bodies are not paid indemnities for 3 consecutive  years
they shall pay insurance  premiums reduced by 20% from the fourth year.
11. Insurance companies
11.1  Compulsory  livestock  insurance  shall  be  run  by  insurance  companies  partly  or
wholly owned by the state.
11.2 Companies in 11.1  shall have capacity to be reinsured by international  companies.
12. Responsibilities to violators of the law
12.1.1  Insurance  companies  that  fail  to  pay  indemnities  wholly  or  partly  they  shall
compensate  them and pay penalty in the daily rate of 0.1%  from  the expired date based
on the value of liability.
12.1.2 Citizens and legal bodies that fail to insure livestock  shall pay insurance premiums
and penalty  10 000-25  000 tugrug in the case of citizens and  10 00040 000 in the case of
officials  and 50 000-200 000 in the case of legal bodies.
12.2 Costs caused by wrong reporting shall be paid by body who is responsible for
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